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This paper seeks to answer the question of which international development projects are 
outsourced from the public bureaucracies when the contractor is a non-profit organization 
(NGO). The transaction cost economics framework is used to analyze the reasons underlying 
the outsourcing decision by isolating the transactional characteristics. The make-or-buy 
decisions made by the public agency in Spain for the international aid delivery projects during 
five years are analyzed. The results achieved shows that the international aid delivery projects 
developed as government subsidies present light formulation reports and more relevant 
contingencies than those developed through an NGO. This fact could make us suspect that the 
government subsidies are used to developed international aid delivery projects involving 
higher levels of complexity, uncertainty and asset specificity. 
 




Este trabajo trata de responder a la pregunta referente a qué proyectos de cooperación al 
desarrollo son externalizados por  el ente público a través una organización no gubernamental 
para el desarrollo (ONGD). Se emplea el marco teórico de la teoría de costes de transacción, y 
en concreto las características transaccionales para analizar las razones que fundamentan la 
externalización. Las decisiones tomadas por la Agencia española de Cooperación al 
Desarrollo durante un periodo de cinco años son analizadas. Los resultados obtenidos 
muestran que los proyectos de cooperación al desarrollo ejecutados como Subvenciones de 
Estado presentan  formulaciones más difusas y contingencias de mayor importancia que 
aquellos ejecutados mediante subvenciones a ONGD lo cual puede implicar mayores niveles 
de complejidad, incertidumbre y especificidad en sus activos. 
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There is a growing interest in public sector outsourcing (Jensen and Stonecash, 
2004), however little is done when the contractor is a non-profit organization 
(O’Reagan and Oster; 2001; Millstein, O’Reagan and Oster; 2000). One of the 
services for which governments are using a make-or-buy strategy worldwide is 
represented by the international aid delivery projects. These projects are 
conducted both ways, inside the structure of public agencies or contracting with 
non-profits from their own country. The objective of this paper is to explain the 
choice between make-or-buy delivery by using transaction cost economic 
framework. Thus, this paper extends the public outsourcing literature by 
providing another setting in which to study outsourcing, and by expanding the 
institutional context to include non-profits.  
 
International aid delivery has become one of the most important aspects of 
OECD and EU countries’ foreign policy. Societies of developed countries have 
become the more and more sensitive about developing and poor countries needs. 
For example, the US applied 15.890 million Euros of its 2007’s budget to 
international aid delivery projects, and this same year, Spain applied 3.754,6 
million Euros. Moreover, there are international organizations such us the 
United Nations (UN) or the World Health Organization (WHO) which are 
developing huge projects in order to reduce the gap between countries’ life 
conditions. Within those international and public agencies, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) have an important role in the international aid delivery 
arena. In fact, in 2007 there were more than 300 international NGOs 
collaborating with the UN. Therefore, it is important to understand in which 
circumstances NGO are the efficient vehicle to deliver public international aid. 
 
The first attempt to fully understand public aid delivery from an institutional 
perspective notices that there is a complex set of interrelationship among 
multiple actors (Gibson, Andersson, Ostrom and Shivakumar, 2005), among 
them, D. Zetland (2007) refers to NGO as a ‘middle men’ with an important role 
in the delivery chain of aid. However, there are questions remaining unanswered 
related to the conditions in which NGO versus public agencies are more efficient 
in the delivery of government international aid (Easterly, 2009). To fill this gap, 
we use transaction cost economics to the international aid delivery in which we 
evaluate those two different possibilities for developing international aid 
delivery projects: the public agency delivery of the international aid projects 






Transaction cost economics tries to identify why firms exist, and the boundaries 
of the firms themselves (Coase 1937, Williamson 1985). Moreover, transaction 
cost economics explain why some transactions are developed inside the firm 
while others are developed by using the market (Williamson 1998). We derive 
those arguments to the public sector and, in particular, to international aid. 
Previous literature and other competitive theories have applied to other public 
sectors (Jarrell and Skibniewski; 1988; Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996) and 
municipal contracting (Bajari and Tadelis; 2001; Hefetz and Warner, 2004; 
Levin and Tadelis, 2004). 
 
Therefore, the objective of the paper is to explain the choice between make-or-
buy delivery and to test to what extent the make-or-buy decision is based on the 
transactional characteristics of the international aid delivery. To achieve this 
objective, we focus on microeconomic analysis that means to look at 
international aid delivery project as unit of analysis. Thus, the development of 
an international aid delivery project is considered as the transaction whose 
characteristics lead the public agency to choose between an internal delivery and 
outsourcing to NGOs. Specifically, we test the make-or-buy decision depending 
on the following transactional cost features: probity, complexity, uncertainty and 
specificity of international aid delivery.  
 
Our empirical setting is formed by the international aid projects funded by the 
Spain’s government (in particular, bilateral non reimbursable official 
development aid –ODA-). The Spanish public agency for cooperation (AECID) 
provided us all the information to build a completely new and unique database. 
AECID has two main instruments for developing international aid delivery 
projects. On the one hand, there is the possibility of granting a subsidy to a NGO 
so this organization can develop the project by itself. On the other hand, the 
public agency could use a government subsidy and develop the project 
internally. Taking into account that AECID develops many projects all over the 
world, we have focus on the international aid delivery projects developed in 
Morocco and Ecuador from 2002 to 2006.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces with a brief 
motivation the theoretical approach, transaction cost economics, under which 
the make-or-buy decision is explained. Section 2 analyzes the transactional 
characteristics of the international aid delivery projects and the implications of 
those characteristics over the make-or-buy decision. Then, in section 3, we 
present the empirical setting for evaluating the research hypothesis, and finally, 








THE MAKE-OR-BUY DECISION  
 
In 1937, with the paper ‘The nature of the firm’, R. Coase threw a question to 
the scientific world: ‘why do firms exist?’ He asked following the classic 
microeconomics assumptions that markets work in a perfect and efficient way 
and firms obtain no profit. However, he observed that firms did exist and made 
some profits, so the classical viewed of the market should be wrong. The answer 
to his question was that developing a transaction in the market has some costs. 
Those costs could be reduced by developing the transaction through a firm. 
Therefore, following Coase’s (1937) hypothesis, market and firms are two 
alternative ways for developing a transaction. Thus, a transaction could be 
developed inside a firm if the costs of doing that are lower than the costs of 
developing the transaction in the market, the make-or-buy decision appears. 
Firms have to decide whether making its activities by themselves or by buying 
goods and services in the market.   
 
Once the make-or-buy decision was stated, a vast number of researchers have 
tried to know when each alternative mode of governance is more efficient. 
Williamson (1975; 1985) put this decision in the center stage and he developed 
transaction cost economics to explain under which conditions outsourcing 
appears more appropriate than the internal governance alternative. Among other 
scholars, Monteverde and Teece (1982) studied the choice between market 
procurement and internal production of automobile components by General 
Motors and Ford. Similarly, Scott Masten (1984) analyzed the make-or-buy 
decision in an aerospace firm which undertook for producing some components. 
 
Other competitive theories also analyze the make-or-buy decision. Property 
rights theory studies the make-or-buy decision by focusing on the hold-up 
problem (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995). This theory tries to figure out 
why private ownership appears to have strong positive incentives for efficiency 
(Preker et al., 2000). Furthermore, in the last years, economic researchers have 
focused on the public sector. In particular, the application of modern economic 
tools to study traditional political science problems has become more and more 
popular, and this literature has created a new theoretical framework known as 
the public choice theory. As expected, the make-or-buy decision has been 
analyzed by using this new theoretical stream. Two examples are Hart et al. 
(1996) studied the prison privatization in the United States of America; and 
Jensen and Stonecash (2004) developed a literature review about the efficiency 









THE TRANSACTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL AID DELIVERY 
 
Following Alesina and Dollar (2000), the foreign aid literature can be divided 
into two parts. The first one studies the effects of foreign aid receiving countries, 
while the other investigates the determinants of foreign aid, namely which donor 
gives to which recipient and why.  
 
Related to the second topic, there is an idealistic literature view (Lumsdaine 
1993) which explains the aid allocation as a function of the recipient country 
needs (per capita GDP, life expectancy, democratic status, etc.). However, this 
“moral vision” contrasts with a bulky literature that has argued that strategic 
foreign policy concerns in the foreign aid allocation (Alesina and Dollar 2000). 
Several authors have postulated that donor’s strategic and political interests 
could be more important as an explanation of aid allocation than the recipient 
country needs. In this sense, Davenport (1970), McKinley and Little (1977, 
1979) discovered that during the Cold War, USA aid allocation pattern responds 
more to the necessity of building a bulwark against communism than to the 
recipient country needs.  Thus, Alesina and Dollar (2000) determined that 
strategic and political variables such as UN voting patterns, colonial relations, or 
the recipient trade openness presented significance for explaining the aid 
allocation. This idea is also contained in Gibson et al’s (2005) study of Swedish 
aid, since they discovered that political variables can “be more important 
determinants of aid allocation than formally stated objectives of aid”. 
 
The strategic and political variables importance may be identified through a new 
institutional economics concept. Thus, in his seminal paper, Williamson (1999) 
defined a concept which could affect the make-or-buy and named it probity. 
This concept could be understood as the honesty and integrity aura involving the 
international relations issues. In this sense, the probity may include the political 
and strategic aspects of the make-or-buy decision that are not explained by the 
classic transactional characteristics. So, if we could ask Williamson about how 
to deliver a specific international aid delivery project he would probably tell us 
that an in-depth analysis of the transactional characteristics of the international 
aid delivery project should be mandatory before deciding how to develop it. In 
this sense, we don’t think that the probity effects are enough to decide whether 
developing an international aid delivery project internally or outsourced. From 
our point of view, all transactional characteristic have to be analyzed and the 
probity is just another element for the public agency to study before undertaking 
the make-or-buy decision. What we believe is that probity might bias the make-
or-buy decision by “forcing” the public agencies to develop the international aid 





commitment with the developing country where the project is going to be 
developed. Thus, we can hypothesize: 
 
H1: Probity makes international aid delivery projects more likely to be 
internally delivered. 
 
Related with the probity issues there is the potential existence of a “hostage” or 
“small numbers” situation, Williamson (1999), the donor has to face with. The 
political atmosphere involving all international aid issues could penalize the 
project performance. When an international aid project is developed internally 
some ties emerged between the donor and the recipient country and the probity 
increases. In order to preserve these links the donor could be “forced” to keep 
investing money by developing several projects even though the performance of 
these is not ensured. Thus, the donor country becomes a hostage of the recipient 
country.  
 
Easterly (2009) strengthens this “hostage” idea by pointing to a minimum 
threshold that has to be passed for reaching a productive international aid 
delivery project performance. The sentence “you can’t build half a bridge”, used 
by Easterly (2009) captured the flavor of the hostage situation since the 
obligation to “finish the bridge” (reach international aid delivery projects 
objectives) it’s what makes the public agency to invest more and more. 
 
An example of this “hostage situation” has recently appeared. August 12th of 
2010, the news agency “Europa Press” informed that the unified police syndicate 
from Spain complains about a new incident involving policewomen in Melilla1. 
The problem is that Moroccans do not recognize policewomen as an authority. 
In fact, the Moroccan government has asked Spain to remove the policewomen 
from the border2. This request faces the objectives of several “gender equality” 
international aid delivery projects Spain has developed lately in the north of 
Morocco, and it would probably force the AECID to develop more projects in 
the future.  
 
This hostage situation is not likely to occur when the international aid is 
outsourced since the NGO is the one who establish those links with the 
developing country and the original donor has not ties to look after. Thus, we 
hypothesize: 
 
H2: A hostage situation is more likely to occur with internally delivered 
international aid projects. 
                                                 
1 Melilla is a Spanish city located in the north of Morocco. 
2 People inside the AECID think that this request is a coerce action for getting more money 





From the transaction cost economics the characterization of the international aid 
delivery projects can be done basically at three levels: asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency. In addition to these classic transactional 
characteristics and by following some economic literature guidelines (Joskow P. 
1988a and 1988b; Masten S., 1984), we have included complexity as another 
important aspect the public agency may look at for deciding how to develop 
transactions, as international aid delivery projects. For the purpose of this paper, 
we focus on three dimensions: complexity, uncertainty and assets specificity3. 
 
However, before applying the transaction cost assumptions to our research there 
are several considerations we have to take into account. First of all, the parts 
involved in the international aid delivery outsourcing are atypical since the 
buyer is a public agency and the seller is a non-profit organization. For 
characterizing this rare contractual situation we can use the findings of 
O’Reagan and Oster (2001). These researchers studied the effect of government 
funding on board practices with a data set on the non-profit contractors of the 
New York City. They define complex transactions as those whose outcome 
quality is harder to determine. For these transactions governments choose 
contracting with non-profits rather than with profit organizations since these 
NGOs are subject to the nondistribution constraint and typically attract a more 
ideological staff. Due to this fact, governments believe they can rely on non-
profits to supply services that are not so easily measured (2001). However, 
contracting with NGOs also has complications. In the same paper (2001) the 
authors discover that board members of NGOs receiving more government 
funding are significantly more likely to picture their board as passive. Other 
research has found that boards have an irrelevant role (Andrés, Martin and 
Romero, 2006). 
 
Keeping in mind the special characteristics of the parts involved in the 
international aid delivery, we follow the transaction cost assumptions since our 
research problem does not involve the choice between profit and non-profit 
organizations as did in the O’Reagan and Oster but the choice between 
contracting with a non-profit and developing the project inside the public 
agency. 
 
According to transaction cost economics, the more complex a transaction the 
more efficient an internal development results. In this sense, Tadelis (2002) and 
Tadelis and Bajari (2001) developed a model in which complex products are 
more likely to be procured internally. They define a project as more complex if 
                                                 
3 We have not included frequency in our hypothesis tests since by considering the 
development of an international aid delivery project as our unit of analysis frequency takes 
the same value for all transactions (the development of international aid delivery projects is 





it is more costly for the buyer to provide a comprehensive design to the seller. 
This complexity makes projects more difficult to translate into complete 
contracts. Due to this contract incompleteness the necessity of ex-post changes 
and adaptations appears. Thus a complex project is more efficient developed 
internally since by making, all transaction costs derived from the ex post 
changes and adaptations caused by the contract incompleteness can be erased. 
Thus, we can hypothesize: 
 
H3: Complex international aid delivery projects are more likely to be internally 
delivered. 
 
Related to the uncertainty, we consider it as the risk that the donor bears due to 
the political and socio-economic constraints of the developing country where the 
project is developed (Andrés, Martin and Romero, 2006). According to 
Williamson (1989; 1999), under high levels of uncertainty an internal 
development of the transaction leads to a better performance. For sporadic 
transactions uncertainty does not involve a problem because with almost no cost 
new trading relations between parties could be easily arranged. However, when 
continuity matters uncertainty becomes a major aspect since all the contract 
adaptations which have to be undertake in order to face all contingencies could 
imply a huge cost, or could be impossible to undertake, which is even worse. As 
Williamson (1985) said “increasing uncertainty makes it more imperative to 
organize transactions within governance structures that have the capacity to 
“work things out”.  
 
Jensen P. and Stonecash R. (2004) proposed that in the absence of uncertainty, 
the principal is able to observe whether the agent dedicated the desire effort 
level by observing the output generated - there is a perfect correlation between 
output and effort. However, under high uncertainty levels, the principal is not 
able to distinguish between the effects of the agent’s effort and random effects 
output, so the agent may act opportunistically. This problem is defined by 
economic literature as moral hazard problem. For overcoming this problem, the 
public agency may transfer risk to the agent, but following the standard 
contracting approach this comes at the price because the agent will charge a risk 
premium for bearing that risk. However, if the risk is extreme there may not be a 
risk premium high enough to cover this risk (i.e. the case of the poor service 
private contractors provided to the U.S. army during the Iraq war; see Krugman, 
2003). This extreme risk is likely to appear in the international aid delivery since 
some of the recipient countries are facing a very unstable sociopolitical situation 







This last argument drove Jensen P. and Stonecash R. (2004) to state that there 
may be limits in the outsourcing of government services since some activities 
may need to remain in the hands of the state to ensure appropriate accountability 
and enforceability. These arguments make it possible to state the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H4: Uncertain international aid delivery projects are more likely to be 
internally delivered. 
 
Asset specificity is commonly defined as the extent to which the investments 
made to support a particular transaction have a higher value to that transaction 
than they would have if they were redeployed for any other purpose 
(McGuinness 1994). According to Williamson (1983) there are at least four 
different types of asset specificity: site specificity; physical asset specificity; 
human asset specificity; and dedicated assets. For the purpose of our research 
we only analyzed the impact of physical and human asset specificity. The 
reasons for ignoring the study of site specificity and dedicated assets derive both 
from the characteristics of our unit of analysis (the development of an 
international aid delivery projects) and the literature guidelines4 5. Human asset 
specificity is viewed as the more influential type of asset specificity in the make-
or-buy dilemma. Masten S. et al (1989) and Moteverde and Teece (1982) 
suggest that human rather than physical assets play a more influential role in 
decisions to bring production within the firm. In this sense, the importance of 
specialized and nonpatentable know-how is emphasized over the other asset 
specificity types in the decision to integrate production (Monteverde and Teece, 
1982). 
 
Following Williamson (1985) parties to a transaction commonly have a choice 
between special purpose and general purpose investments. For transactions that 
are supported by investments in special (specific) assets, autonomous trading 
(buy) will commonly be supplanted by unified ownership (make). This situation 
arises since investments in specialized (specific) assets are risky in that these 
assets cannot be redeployed without sacrifice of productive value if contract 
should be interrupted or prematurely terminated (Williamson (1985)). By 
developing the transaction internally the prematurely termination of the contract 
is avoid, thus, there is no need to redeploy specific assets and non sacrifice of 
productive value has to be assumed.  
                                                 
4 Site specificity has no influence since the allocation of the international aid delivery project 
plays no role in the make-or-buy decision the public agency for cooperation in Spain 
undertakes. 
5 Dedicated assets are a very special type of asset specificity which only plays a role when a 





We have to keep in mind that according to Williamson (1985) asset specificity 
only takes on importance in conjunction with bounded rationality and in the 
presence of uncertainty. However, this does not represent any problem since 
bounded rationality is one of our theoretical assumptions and uncertainty is a 
common characteristic of the international issues which is analyzed in our fourth 
hypothesis. Thus, we can hypothesize. 
 
H5: International aid delivery projects involving investments on specific assets 




In this section, we present the institutional setting, the process of collecting 




ODA is delivered by AECID using different instruments: bilateral and 
multilateral aid, and reimbursable and non reimbursable aid. Each four year, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents a Master Plan in which they unfold new 
instruments trying to adapt international aid to specific needs of recipient 
countries. Once the budget is approved by the Parliament, AECID distributes 
through its specific departments and units (Figure 1). Because the Master Plan is 
annually budgeted, AECID has a commitment with priority countries and CAD 
sectors. Once those decisions are made, the next step is to select specific 
projects to be delivered both ways, by the means of NGO or within the public 
agency itself. Projects are evaluated by experts inside the public agency and 
those evaluations will be presented to the selection committee whose members 
come from the political arena. The experts and committee members deciding 
which projects are going to be funded are similar for the in-house and 
outsourced projects. However, the selection is not always taken in the same 
committee and those committees are going to be working constantly along the 
year. Therefore this is process in which several factors have an influence from 
which, in this paper we want to evaluate the transactional ones. 
 
Moreover, we focus on two of them: NGO projects and government subsidies 
(both belong to bilateral non-reimbursable aid). As we previously mentioned, on 
the one hand, the public agency has the chance to develop the international aid 
delivery project by contracting with an NGO. This contract can acquire the form 
of a NGO project, which is a whole of actions designed to reach a development 
specific objective in an established term, in a country and for a defined recipient 
population and whose effects last when its execution is finished. We consider 





does not developed the international aid delivery projects by its own but through 
a contract with a private organization. On the other hand, the public agency can 
develop the international aid delivery project by its own. This in-house option is 
materialized through an instrument called government subsidy. Government 
subsidies start with a political meeting between the ministers of the recipient and 
the donor country and they consist in an agreement between these two countries.  
The starting meeting is mainly a negotiation for setting the sectors the 
international aid delivery projects have to work in, but no specific international 
aid delivery projects are discussed. Once the main guidelines are designed, the 
public agency technicians decide which international aid delivery projects are 
the most appropriate in terms of fulfilling the objectives designed in the starting 
meeting. We have considered the government subsidies as the make in the 
make-or-buy decision since the public agency does not contract with any 
external organization for developing the international aid delivery project but it 
develops it by itself in the recipient country.  
 
Regarding the data, our empirical population is given by the international aid 
delivery projects Spain developed in Ecuador and Morocco during the period 
2002 – 2006 (we use just the bilateral non-reimbursable official development 
aid). Before explaining the process of gathering the information we comment the 
relevance of those two countries for Spain’s international aid strategy.  
 
Historically Morocco and Spain has shared a common past. This common 
history started with the migration of the muslins to Morocco after the Christians 
of Spain reconquered in 1492 the south of the European country. After that 
event, other facts have linked these countries. One of the most important could 
be represented by the invasion Spain made in the nineteenth century. This and 
other less important historical facts make the society of Spain to feel in doubt 
with the African country. 
 
Focusing in the present, the main link between Spain and Morocco is 
represented by migration. According to the data from the Ministry of Labour 
and Immigration in 2010 there were 775.054 Moroccans living in Spain with a 
resident card. These 775.054 immigrants mean a 16% of the total migrations 
Spain suffered in 2008 and they make Morocco the first country in terms of 
migration to Spain. However, not all migration from Morocco is regulated and 
for example during the 2008 13.424 immigrants entered illegally in Spain by 
using boats. If we take a look at the media we find lots of examples of the 
problems Spain have with the illegal Moroccan immigration (i.e. April 4th of 
2010 the Agence France-Presse (AFP) informs that thirty-three Moroccans were 
sentenced for assisting illegal immigration; August 31th of 2009 El Mundo 
informs that during august 2009 an average of 16 immigrants arrived to the cost 





The reasons for including Ecuador in our study are very close to those we have 
just explained for Morocco. As we all know in 1492 an expedition from Spain 
commanded by Cristobal Colon arrived and discover the Americas. For almost 
300 years Ecuador was a colony of Spain so many link between the American 
and European country, being the Spanish language the most important one, were 
established. In fact, some people talks about Spain as the Motherland for the 
Latin-American countries. If we take a look at the present links the migration is 
again the most important one. According to the data from the Ministry of Labour 
and Immigration in 2010 there were 437.279 Ecuadorians living in Spain with a 
resident card. Those 437.279 immigrants make Ecuador the third country after 
Morocco and Rumania in terms of migration to Spain. 
 
In terms of official development aid we have chosen Ecuador and Morocco 
since they are considered in the “group A” of countries (see Master Plans). This 
category includes low income countries where the international aid delivery has 
the chance for creating a long-term link and to be highly efficient. In fact, 66% 
of the funds of the public agency for cooperation are delivered to those “group A 
countries” (2009).  
 
During the period 2002 – 2006 the public agency for cooperation and 
development in Spain (AECID) delivered in Morocco 55 government subsidies 
and 31 subsidies to NGOs. For the same period AECID delivered in Ecuador 97 
government subsidies and 19 subsidies to NGOs. 
 
Gathering of information 
 
Since there is no data base including information about the international aid 
delivery projects Spain develops, we have been forced to create our own data 
base. In order to fulfil this task we have checked over the information the public 
agency for cooperation keeps in their records. However, we have faced several 
problems in this task.  
 
The first one appears because there is no protocol for monitoring the 
international aid delivery projects so each instrument is registered in a different 
way. In this sense, we have found international aid delivery projects which could 
be analyzed in a quantitative way while others have almost no quantitative 
information. We have to be aware of this situation when comparing international 
delivery projects and instruments and therefore use simultaneously quantitative 
analysis with qualitative techniques. 
 
The second problem we faced was related with the time period (2002 - 2006) we 
choose as the horizon for the research. By doing field work, we have realised 





almost all projects have suffered extensions in its length. This situation is 
especially common in the government subsidies and has forced us to include 
international aid delivery projects which are alive nowadays and for which 
information gaps exists.  
 
Another difficulty was related to the existence of linked international aid 
delivery projects. Sometimes the government subsidies which length is superior 
to a year are organized in several records (one per year). We have considered 
those different records as a unique international aid delivery project since all the 
different records shared a global objective and a unique public subsidy 
resolution. Another link between international aid delivery projects is the 
common subsidies that the public agency donates. This special donations are 
linked whether a specific international aid delivery projects or a group of 
international aid delivery projects. Despite of the fact that the public agency in 
Spain considers these common subsidies as an independent record we have 
considered those special subsidies as a part of the international aid delivery 
project they are linked to since its objective is no other than facilitate the 
performance of the project they are linked to. 
 
Regarding these problems our final empirical sample is formed by fifty-one 
government subsidies, twenty of them were developed in Morocco and the rest 
(thirty-one) were developed in Ecuador; and forty-four subsidies to 
nongovernmental organizations, twenty-five were developed in Morocco and 
nineteen in Ecuador. Those ninety-five international aid delivery projects 
represents a 47,3% of the international aid delivery projects Spain developed in 
Morocco and Ecuador during the period 2002 – 2006.  
 
Variables and Measures 
 
Our dependent variable, the make-or-buy decision, is a dummy variable, which 
takes the value of zero when the international aid delivery project is developed 
internally through a government subsidy and the value of one when the 
international aid delivery project is outsourced (Martín Cruz and Gámez Alcalde 
2010). 
 
Related to the exogenous variables, we have developed several measures, based 
on previous empirical studies when possible and creating new ones when there 
was a lack of previous measurement. We have to mention that in the analysis we 
use ex-ante measures, except for uncertainty in which we introduce ex-ante 
measures as we present next. 
 
Probity has been defined as the honesty and integrity aura involving the 





presents significant troubles. In fact there are no measurements of the probity 
proposed in the literature. For the purpose of this paper and seeking after the 
robustness different ways of valuation are developed. 
 
1. Probity is valuated using as a proxy the sectors (OECD CRS, 
Creditor Reporting System) in which each project is developed, to 
have the flavour of the necessity for more integrity and honesty for 
some of the OECD list of sectors. In this sense, we consider that the 
sectors identified in the Master Plan as priority are the ones that 
present higher levels of probity. Following this argument the probity 
is codified in a dummy variable which value is one if the sector in 
which a project is developed is considered in the Master Plan as 
priority. 
 
2. Since the Technical Office for Cooperation is the main subsidiary of 
the Agency for cooperation in Spain in the recipient country we think 
that the closer an international delivery project location is to the 
Technical Office for Cooperation the higher the visibility of project’s 
performance. Due to this fact, we consider that the distance in 
kilometres to the Technical Office for Cooperation (normalized by 
the total country extension) could be an indicator of the project 
probity level.  In this sense we assume that the closer the 
international project location to the technical office for cooperation 
the higher the probity level. 
 
3. Since probity is a concept encompassed more in the political 
framework than in the economic one we have consider the number of 
relevant political news in the main newspapers of Spain during the 
2001-2006 period as a proxy of the level of probity a recipient 
country presents.  Obviously, this measure attempts to show probity 
differences across countries, remaining constant for the different 
international aid delivery projects developed in a particular recipient 
country.  
 
We have considered the hostage situation as the objection the agency for 
cooperation in Spain has to close the expedient of an international aid delivery 
project presenting a bad performance Just as happened with the probity, the 
hostage situation has not been measured in previous research. In this paper we 
proposed three different indicators of the hostage situation. 
 
1. We consider that the existence of an exceptional delay in the 
international aid delivery project is a good indicator of the existence 





measures we first consider that the higher the number of extensions 
in the project deadline the more relevant the hostage situation is. We 
also consider that the higher the total delay (in months) of the project 
deadline the more relevant the hostage situation is. 
 
2. In order to close an international aid delivery project record a 
favourable report of the Agency for cooperation external audit is 
mandatory. However, there are cases in which the agency for 
cooperation grants the possibility of passing the audit report more 
than one time. In this sense, we consider that the number of audit 
reports could be an indicator of the existence of a hostage situation so 
the higher the number of audit reports the higher more relevant the 
hostage situation is. 
 
3. Sometimes, the Agency for cooperation in Spain develops 
international aid delivery projects which complement or continue 
with the objectives set in previous international aid delivery projects. 
We think that this project concatenation could be an indicator of the 
hostage situation. Following this idea we consider that the higher the 
number of previous chained international aid delivery projects, the 
more relevant the hostage situation is. 
 
Complexity is a variable that has been evaluated systematically in transaction 
cost literature. For the automobile industry, Monteverde and Teece (1982) 
identified complexity by the engineering investment required for the 
development of a new automobile component. Tadelis and Bajari (2001) defined 
a project as more complex if it is more costly for the buyer to provide a 
comprehensive design to the seller6. Following the complexity definition given 
by Tadelis and Bajari (2001) we measure international aid delivery projects 
complexity by the number of activities specified in the formulation report. In 
this sense, we consider that complex projects makes the formulation report more 
difficult to specify so the more complex the international aid delivery project, 
the less complete its formulation report. 
 
Knowing that a unique measure of the complexity could cause problems in the 
results robustness we come up with another indicator of this variable. Tadelis, 
Bajari and McMillan (2003) measured the project complexity in the construction 
sector as the (log) value of the project. We adopt this idea and postulate that the 
bigger the amount of money involved in the international aid delivery project, 
the more difficult for providing a complete and comprehensive design of the 
                                                 
6 Following Tadelis and Bajari (2001) project T is more complex than project T’ if it (project 





international aid delivery project thus the more complex the international aid 
delivery project. 
 
Williamson (1985) explains the effect of the uncertainty by linking it with the 
possibility of any contractual party for acting opportunistically. Attaching to this 
idea, we think that the length7 of the international aid delivery project could be 
an indicator of the uncertainty level since the longer the international aid 
delivery project length, the more prospective for an opportunistic behaviour to 
concur. 
 
Although there are several empirical research that have studied the assets 
specificity there is no standardized way for measure it. In fact, each researcher 
has to determine what assets are the specific ones for his or her research and 
what the best way for measuring them is. For the automobile components 
industry, Monteverde and Teece (1982) used the engineering effort as a measure 
of the degree of human asset specificity. Scott Masten (1984) developed a 
measure for the design specificity based on questionnaire answers given by the 
procurement team of an aerospace company as to whether an aerospace 
component were “specific”, “somewhat specific” or “standard”. 
 
For achieving our research objective we have developed two different measures 
of asset specificity. The first one is related to physical asset specificity, and is 
based on the two budgetary concepts the Agency for cooperation in Spain 
distinguish in its accounting procedures. On the one hand, the Agency for 
cooperation in Spain has a budgetary concept (named “496”) which involves all 
expenditures in consumables. On the other hand, there is a budgetary concept 
(named “796”) which involves the investments needed for the correct 
performance of the international aid delivery project. We believe that the 
proportion of investment expenditures over the consumables ones is a god 
indicator of the physical asset specificity level involved in the international aid 
delivery project, so the higher the proportion of “796” over “496”, the higher the 
level of physical asset specificity. 
 
The second measure is related to the human asset specificity and is based on the 
existence of a technical assistance, which consists in hiring a specific experts 
that to enhance the performance of some international aid delivery projects. We 
consider that the hiring of these experts involves an investment in specific 
human assets since the experts have a very specific profile which is attached 
with the international aid delivery project specifications. Following this 
                                                 
7 We consider the length provided in the formulation report (theoretical length) as the proxy 
for the uncertainty level since deadline extensions are ex-post changes that cannot affect the 





argument human asset specificity is set as a dummy variable which takes the 




Our empirical analysis combines a quantitative analysis (exploratory and 
explicative) with a qualitative analysis (narrative analysis) and tries to illustrate 
when an international aid delivery project is outsourced. Therefore, we first 
begin our analysis conducting a descriptive study; and second, we test the 
explanatory model to verify the previously proposed hypotheses by developing a 
binary logistic regression. 
 
Quantitative analysis (descriptive, ANOVA, and logistic regression) 
 
Our first purpose in globally characterizing the make-or-buy decision has to do 
with the features of the international aid delivery projects developed as 
government subsidies or as subsidies to NGOs. Hence, we have divided up the 
sample into two groups: government subsidies (make) and subsidies to NGOs 
(buy). In table 1 we report the mean value of the most relevant variables for each 
group of international aid delivery projects, and the mean comparison tests and 
the associated p-value. 
 
Although these results only have a descriptive purpose, we can assert, with high 
levels of confidence, that international aid delivery projects outsourced as 
subsidies to NGOs share some common characteristics (table 1). For instance, 
these international aid delivery projects present a small size, list a considerable 
number of activities in the formulation report, has a real length below two years 
with almost no delays and they have no relevant investments in specific assets. 
 
Therefore, projects delivered by NGOs show a low complexity level measured 
both by the project size, and the hardiness for providing a comprehensive 
design. The asset specificity reasons are also supported since as we postulated 
low investments in specific assets makes the international aid delivery project 
more likely to be outsourced. The same situation occurs with the hostage 
situation hypothesis measured by the delays size and the real length of the 
international aid delivery project. On the contrary, the probity and uncertainty 







Table 1: Characteristics of projects (make-or-buy)  
Mean value of each variable. The t-test allows the comparison of means 
and p-value is the threshold value to reject the null hypothesis of mean 
equality between groups.  
Variable 
No. 
observations Make Buy 
t-test p-value 
Amount 94 472353.5 292664.3 6.13 0.015 
Real length 71 31.45 22.63 6.50 0.013 
Initial delay 70 2.00 0.74 1.96 0.166 
Final delay 68 14.40 3.23 15.26 0.000 
Number of 
activities 
94 6.18 16.98 43.48 0.000 
Theoretical 
length 
89 20.77 18.71 2.59 0.111 
Physical 
assets 
92 0.41 0.23 9.48 0.003 
Human assets 94 0.14 0.00 6.85 0.010 
Distance to 
OTC 
77 1.60 1.46 0.16 0.693 
News 94 182.33 260.14 2.97 0.088 
Number of 
extensions 
69 0.90 0.79 0.23 0.631 
CRS 89 0.61 0.61 0.00 0.962 
Auditing 
reports 








92 0.65 0.00 24.25 0.000 
 
Despite some caveats are necessary to interpret the analysis, the results of the 
ANOVA analysis confirm the previous descriptives. Our second, third, and fifth 
hypotheses could be the explanations of the make-or-buy decision. In this sense 
we observe that the real length of the project and the final delay (hostage 
situation) are significant. The same situation arises with the amount granted by 
the AECID and the number of activities specified (complexity). Finally, the 
variables related with the asset specificity also are significant. 
 
 In sum, even though an explanatory analysis is required, we observe that 
transactional characteristics, such as complexity and asset specificity, are 






As previously stated, the second step is an explanatory analysis, by using a 
binary logistic regression. This binary logistic regression is suitable when the 
dependent variable is non-metric and consists of just two groups so it is a perfect 
methodology for testing the dependent variable of our research. 
 
 




Constant 1.45 0.52 
Probity 0.09 0.05 
Hostage   
   Real length -0.08* 3.44 
   Initial delay -0.25 2.53 
Complexity 0.18** 4.66 
Specificity   
   Physical assets -4.77** 4.38 
   Human assets -20.64 0.00 





















To avoid problems of multicollinearity between variables (see table 1 in the 
appendix) we use as exogenous variables the physical asset specificity, the 
human asset specificity, the number of activities specified, the project real 
length, the initial delay, the distance to the Technical Office for Cooperation, 
and the country where the international aid delivery project was developed. 
 
The results show the importance of the hostage situation, complexity and asset 
specificity variables (Table 2). Related to complexity we observe that the 
variable number of activities is statistically significant at a 95% confidence 
level. Furthermore, the positive sign of its coefficient corroborates our third 
hypothesis since the higher the number of activities specified, the lower the 
complexity level and the more suitable to an outsourcing decision8. 
 
                                                 
8 We have codified our dependent variable as 0 for the make (governmental subsidy) and 1 for 





The asset specificity hypothesis (hypothesis 5) is partially verified for the 
physical assets. As we observe, the variable physical specificity is significant at 
a 95% confidence level. The negative sign of its coefficient indicates that the 
higher the investment in physical specific asset the less suitable to an 
outsourcing decision. 
 
The variable real length is significant at a 90% confidence level. The negative 
sign of its coefficient indicates that the higher the real length of the international 
aid delivery project, the less suitable to an outsourcing decision. As we can see 
our second hypothesis is confirmed and a hostage situation is more suitable to 
occur in an internal development. 
 
Our first and forth hypothesis, related respectively to the probity and uncertainty 
are not verified since the variables associated to this transactional characteristics 
are not statistically significant.  
 
Finally, we can measure the global goodness-of-fit indices through the forecast 
power our model posses. We see that our model has properly classified 95,2% of 
the international aid delivery projects. We observe that the forecasting power is 
a bit higher for the buy option (table 2). 
 
Qualitative analysis (narrative analysis) 
 
In order to shed more light on the make-or-buy decision AECID has to 
undertake, we discuss the following six international aid delivery projects from 
our sample in Morocco. Three of this selected international aid delivery projects 
are government subsidies and the other three are subsidies to NGOs. The main 
reason for comparing the “make” and the “buy” option through a qualitative 
analysis is the possibility to discover something the numbers are not able to 
show. 
 
Before presenting the main results obtained of this qualitative analysis we have 
to expose the criteria we have followed for selecting these six international aid 
delivery projects.  
 
1. First of all, we have selected international aid delivery projects 
granted all over the research period. Specifically, we have selected 
government subsidies granted in 2002, 2003 and 2005; and 
subsidies granted to NGOs in 2002, 2004 and 2005. 
 
2. Related to the amount granted by the public agency in Spain, four 
of the six international aid delivery projects selected are situated 





characteristic of the government subsidies and the subsidies to 
NGOs. However, we have also selected an atypically big subsidy to 
NGO and an atypically small government subsidy. On the average, 
government subsidies imply a bigger amount of money than the 
subsidies to NGOs, so we want to test if a big subsidy to NGO 
possesses the same characteristics than the government subsidies 
(and vice versa). 
 
We first present the results obtained from the qualitative analysis developed for 
the three government subsidies. In order to do that, we analyzed the 
representative ones so we can have an idea about the main characteristics of the 
government subsidies and then we compare them with the smallest one seeking 
for significant differences. 
 
Government subsidy 1 (1.383.900,71€). The first document we analyzed is a 
three pages project file. This file gives the flavour of the international aid 
delivery project by describing the expected results and the activities to undertake 
for reaching them. We want to highlight that only five broad activities are listed 
and the explanation of them is really light (only one sentence). This could 
suggest high levels of complexity since as we have postulate, complexity is 
related to the difficulty for providing a comprehensive design of the 
international aid delivery project. 
 
Activites: 
 La construction d’un point de debarquement amenage a Oued Laou et 
appui aux associations de marins pecheurs. 





 Construction of a landing point in Oued Laou and support to 
fishermen associations. 
 Development of a tourist analysis of the Oued Laou zone. 
 …… 
  
Another aspect that deserves to be mentioned is the quantity and nature of the 
file modifications the recipient has requested. Talking about the number, we find 
4 different requests. Three of these requests are related to project deadline 
extensions making a total delay of 42 months. The remaining one is related to an 
activity change consisting in the development of a solid waste management plan 
instead of the development of a tourist analysis of the Oued Laou zone that has 





related to the existence of high levels of uncertainty and a hostage situation 
which prevents the public agency for cooperation in Spain to close the project 
file in its time by forcing it to keep allowing more and more deadline extensions. 
Another aspect that could suggest the existence of a hostage situation is the 
request of an expert who assures a proper project performance. This request 
implies the granting of more money, and because it is necessary for the project 
performance the public agency for cooperation is forced to fund it. 
 
Government subsidy 2 (706.297€). For the study of this government subsidy we 
have evaluated the formulation report. This report is developed by the recipient 
organization and tries to communicate the whole meaning of the international 
aid delivery project. This report has an extension of 43 pages and if we look at 
the results and activities description we observe they are “well” described.  
 
Resultado 6 
Descripción: En funcionamiento el laboratorio portátil de agua. 
Indicadores objetivamente verificables: Número de análisis de agua 
 
Actividad 1.2 
Descripción: Instalación del riego por goteo en las parcelas piloto. 
Insumos: Material de riego, mano de obra y maquinaria. 
Costes: 59.002.469 ptas. 
 
The previous analysis could imply the supplying of a comprehensive project 
design and the existence of low levels of complexity. So, attending to 
complexity we could assume that this project should have been developed 
through a subsidy to NGO. However, we have to analyze other transactional 
variables. We discovered that the public agency for cooperation in Spain has 
funded the contracting of an expert for assuring the coordination and correct 
performance of the international aid delivery project.  
 
This additional grant could be interpreted as a hostage situation since the Public 
agency for cooperation in Spain is forced to invest more money in order to 
assure the achievement of project objectives.  
 
Related to the uncertainty, we find that the deadline of the project has suffered 
an extension on nine months. Besides, an activity modification (consisting in an 
activities cancellation) has been request and approved by the public agency for 
cooperation in Spain. Both facts, could be interpreted as the existence of high 
levels of uncertainty, and could justify an internal development of the 






Government subsidy 3 (225.000€). Despite of the fact that this subsidy is a small 
one its granting report only lists three (unspecific) activities in the project 
performance. This fact could be against the use of project size as an indicator of 
the complexity level. Attending at the delays in the project deadline we find a 
request for a twelve months extension related to a very complicated processing 
of technical and administrative nature. This could be interpreted as consequence 
of the existence of high levels of uncertainty. 
 
Para ello se financiarán las siguientes actividades: 
 Suministro transporte e instalación de 2.400 ml de tuberías en PVC. 
 Suministro transporte e instalación de 7.600 ml de tuberías en PEHD. 
 Suministro transporte e instalación de 5 reductores de presión. 
 
Attending these circumstances, we are able to postulate that the size of the 
international aid delivery project is not enough to choose between an internal or 
outsourced development.    
 
Here we comment the results obtained from the qualitative analysis of the three 
subsidies to NGOs that were selected. Before entering in the discussion of the 
results we notice that the analysis has been made in the same terms that we 
already developed for the government subsidies so a comparison is been 
possible. 
 
Subsidy to NGO 1 (171.230€). The first aspect we want to highlight is that this 
international aid delivery project posses not just a formulation report but a 
power point presentation where a complete description of the project is made. 
The presentation agenda is formed by title, entities, main lines, main objective, 
specific objective, expected results and activities, project schedule, performance 
indicators, project social action. As we can see, this presentation provide more 
than just the flavour of the project but a integrate description of it. If we attend 
at the expected activities we find a list of thirteen different activities. This list is 
really detailed for a 171.230€ international aid delivery project. All this facts 
could be interpreted as an absence of high complexity levels surrounding the 
international aid delivery project. 
 
Regarding the uncertainty or the hostage situation there is not much to say since 
the NGO made no request for project deadline extension, or technical support. In 
fact, the international aid delivery project is close by the time it was suppose to 
end. 
 
Subsidy to NGO 2 (329.429,53€). In the same way that the first subsidy to NGO 
analyzed, this international aid delivery project possesses a formulation report in 





main ideas of the international aid delivery project. Besides, there is an excel 
document which takes care of the economic aspects of the international aid 
delivery project by specifying the budget and the cost each activity has 
associated. Taking into account all this information we can assure that the 
project design is properly specified and the international aid delivery project 
complexity is not very high. 
 
Actividad Humanos Materiales Costes 
Acondicionamiento 
de un tramo de pista 
y apertura de un 
tramo nuevo.  

















One of the most significant characteristics of this project is that the developing 
NGO starts and finishes its activities before it was originally formulated. This 
fact gives us an idea about the NGO commitment and could be interpreted as 
low uncertainty levels surrounding the international aid delivery project. In fact, 
the NGO had no doubts about the project performance and it starts the 
formulated activities before the money granting.  
 
Subsidy to NGO 3 (517.573€). Although this subsidy to NGO has a bigger size 
than the mean value (267.516,55€) its formulation report is really complete. 
Besides, we find several electronic files that specified the international aid 
delivery project characteristics and complete the formulation report. Among 
these files we stress the word documents which explain each of the project 
activities and the excel documents that inform about the project budget. All this 
aspects shows that even tough this subsidy to NGO has a bigger size its 
complexity level (measure by the Tadelis and Bajari 2002 definition) is not 
different than the level found in the other two subsidies studied before. 
 
However, in terms of uncertainty and hostage situation this subsidy to NGO 
does present differences respect the other two subsidies studied before. The 
differences arrived from the existence of a request for a six months deadline 
extension and a budget modification. In this sense, this subsidy to NGO looks 
like the government subsidies studied since it presents high levels of uncertainty 
and some hostage situation. 
 
From the qualitative analysis results some conclusions can be draw.  First of all 
we have characterized both the government subsidies and the subsidies to NGOs 





during the international aid delivery projects life. In this sense, we have 
concluded that government subsidies have a simpler formulation report in which 
a small number of general activities are specified. ON the other hand, subsidies 
to NGO have more complete formulation reports. Besides, these reports use to 
be accompanied to activities and budget descriptions in electronic files. All these 
conclusions drive us to postulate that the government subsidies present higher 
levels of complexity than the subsidies to NGO. 
 
Related to the modification requests recipient organizations make during the 
international aid deliver projects life we have seen that the government subsidies 
use to present some performance troubles which force the public agency for 
cooperation in Spain to extend the projects deadline and in some cases, it is 
forced to grant more money in order to hire an expert who assures the project 
performance. On the other hand, subsidies to NGO use to finish by the time it 
was formulated. Those facts drive us to conclude that government subsidies 
present higher level of uncertainty and are more likely to “kidnap” the public 
agency for cooperation. 
Finally, we test if atypical international aid delivery projects behave 
significantly different than the representative ones. In this sense, we haven’t 
found significant differences although it is true that the big subsidy to NGO 
present modifications requests similar than those which appear in the 
government subsidies. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
By applying the transaction cost hypotheses we have tried to shed some light 
over the make-or-buy decision the public agency face when develops an 
international aid delivery project. Taking into account the information obtained 
from the data some important conclusions can be draw.  On the one hand, the 
results show that the transactional characteristics of the international aid delivery 
projects are the key for solving the make-or-by dilemma. In this sense, asset 
specificity and complexity seem to be the main transactional characteristics 
influenced the make-or-buy decision, and their hypotheses are confirm in the 
direction appointed by the transaction cost literature.  
 
On the other hand, the make-or-buy decision is also influenced by the 
institutional framework surrounding the international aid delivery issues. The 
probity and some other institutional aspects such as the existence of a hostage 
situation could bias the make-or-buy decision taking it away from the classical 
transaction cost economic assumptions. These institutional aspects could 
represent the main topics for future research. Furthermore, they represent a 






Some limitations have to be stated. First, the probity indicators haven’t result 
statistically significant. This situation may suggest that probity is not an 
important variable when facing the make-or-buy decision. We guess that these 
problems could arise from the measures that have been used. In fact, we still 
think that the probity is an important factor which could determine the make-or-
buy decision and we will try to improve the measurement. 
 
Related the uncertainty, we been faced the same problem and the measure for 
this variable has not resulted statistically significant. We claim that the measure 
for the hostage situation could be capturing part of the uncertainty, so in the 
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,001 ,008 ,000 ,186 ,000 ,967 ,001 ,002 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,756 ,017 ,011 ,231 ,002 ,003 ,088
95 95 72 71 69 95 95 90 93 78 95 70 58 90 93 93 95 95 95
,487** ,307** ,589** ,014 ,359** -,146 ,342** 1 ,172 -,115 ,342** ,255* ,084 ,110 -,018 ,010 ,480** ,378** -,169
,000 ,003 ,000 ,911 ,003 ,170 ,001 ,105 ,325 ,001 ,036 ,546 ,315 ,868 ,929 ,000 ,000 ,111
90 90 69 69 67 90 90 90 90 75 90 68 54 85 88 88 90 90 90
,393** ,279** ,312** ,086 ,421** -,365** ,310** ,172 1 -,200 ,310** ,188 ,257 ,287** ,295** -,036 ,309** ,274** -,307**
,000 ,007 ,008 ,476 ,000 ,000 ,002 ,105 ,081 ,002 ,119 ,054 ,007 ,005 ,734 ,003 ,008 ,003
93 93 72 71 69 93 93 90 93 77 93 70 57 88 91 91 93 93 93
-,072 -,069 -,168 -,033 -,222 ,111 -,547** -,115 -,200 1 -,547** -,199 -,056 -,454** ,308** ,300** -,042 -,087 -,045
,534 ,546 ,188 ,794 ,082 ,334 ,000 ,325 ,081 ,000 ,122 ,692 ,000 ,007 ,009 ,715 ,447 ,693
78 78 63 64 62 78 78 75 77 78 78 62 53 74 76 76 78 78 78
,349** ,270** ,429** ,159 ,436** ,004 1,000** ,342** ,310** -,547** 1 ,439** -,042 ,251* -,262* -,125 ,317** ,297** ,176
,001 ,008 ,000 ,186 ,000 ,967 ,000 ,001 ,002 ,000 ,000 ,756 ,017 ,011 ,231 ,002 ,003 ,088
95 95 72 71 69 95 95 90 93 78 95 70 58 90 93 93 95 95 95
,342** ,228 ,681** ,340** ,729** ,137 ,439** ,255* ,188 -,199 ,439** 1 -,114 -,116 -,211 -,147 ,355** ,160 -,058
,004 ,058 ,000 ,005 ,000 ,259 ,000 ,036 ,119 ,122 ,000 ,427 ,341 ,082 ,227 ,003 ,185 ,631
70 70 67 67 65 70 70 68 70 62 70 70 51 70 69 69 70 70 70
-,044 .a ,044 -,050 ,019 -,282* -,042 ,084 ,257 -,056 -,042 -,114 1 -,184 ,282* ,339** -,016 .a -,445**
,743 ,000 ,750 ,718 ,891 ,032 ,756 ,546 ,054 ,692 ,756 ,427 ,166 ,032 ,009 ,908 ,000 ,000
58 58 56 55 52 58 58 54 57 53 58 51 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
,125 -,011 -,092 ,161 -,082 -,229* ,251* ,110 ,287** -,454** ,251* -,116 -,184 1 -,076 -,039 ,154 ,061 ,005
,241 ,921 ,441 ,181 ,505 ,030 ,017 ,315 ,007 ,000 ,017 ,341 ,166 ,482 ,720 ,148 ,565 ,962
90 90 72 71 69 90 90 85 88 74 90 70 58 90 89 89 90 90 90
-,042 -,102 -,015 ,041 -,036 -,327** -,262* -,018 ,295** ,308** -,262* -,211 ,282* -,076 1 ,064 ,007 -,114 -,411**
,690 ,329 ,898 ,735 ,770 ,001 ,011 ,868 ,005 ,007 ,011 ,082 ,032 ,482 ,544 ,949 ,276 ,000
93 93 71 70 68 93 93 88 91 76 93 69 58 89 93 93 93 93 93
-,042 -,047 ,009 -,044 ,041 -,388** -,125 ,010 -,036 ,300** -,125 -,147 ,339** -,039 ,064 1 -,094 -,004 -,459**
,688 ,655 ,940 ,717 ,741 ,000 ,231 ,929 ,734 ,009 ,231 ,227 ,009 ,720 ,544 ,373 ,970 ,000
93 93 71 70 68 93 93 88 91 76 93 69 58 89 93 93 93 93 93
,881** ,401** ,614** ,245* ,556** -,013 ,317** ,480** ,309** -,042 ,317** ,355** -,016 ,154 ,007 -,094 1 ,433** -,168
,000 ,000 ,000 ,040 ,000 ,899 ,002 ,000 ,003 ,715 ,002 ,003 ,908 ,148 ,949 ,373 ,000 ,103
95 95 72 71 69 95 95 90 93 78 95 70 58 90 93 93 95 95 95
,574** ,908** ,357** -,019 ,378** -,098 ,297** ,378** ,274** -,087 ,297** ,160 .a ,061 -,114 -,004 ,433** 1 -,262*
,000 ,000 ,002 ,877 ,001 ,344 ,003 ,000 ,008 ,447 ,003 ,185 ,000 ,565 ,276 ,970 ,000 ,010
95 95 72 71 69 95 95 90 93 78 95 70 58 90 93 93 95 96 95
-,249* -,238* -,291* -,166 -,431** ,564** ,176 -,169 -,307** -,045 ,176 -,058 -,445** ,005 -,411** -,459** -,168 -,262* 1
,015 ,020 ,013 ,166 ,000 ,000 ,088 ,111 ,003 ,693 ,088 ,631 ,000 ,962 ,000 ,000 ,103 ,010



























































por AECID en €
Importe de la AT €
Meses de ejecucion real






Periodo de ejecución en





y el presupuesto total
Distancia del lugar del







Numero de informes de
auditoria para el proyecto






































































La correlación es significativa al nivel 0,01 (bilateral).**. 
La correlación es significante al nivel 0,05 (bilateral).*. 
No se puede calcular porque al menos una variable es constante.a.  










Government subsidies Subsidy Amount* AT?* Real Length** Initial delay** Final delay**
Physical 
A.Spec. Activities 
Project 1 Organization 1 1.020.000,00 x 37 3 19 0,784 11 
Project 2 Organization 1 900.000,00 x 40 25 22 0,722 9 
Project 3 Organization 2 636.067,00 x 32 11 25 0,679 12 
Project 4 Organization 3 1.376.000,00 126.000 61 0 37 0,712 15 
Project 5 Organization 4 481.900,00 x 57 0 45 1 4 
Project 6 Organization 4 1.383.900,71 70.028 74 5 42 0,805 17 
Project 7 Organization 4 618.862,00 x 90 0 63 0,665 6 
Project 8 Organization 4 620.000,00 x 63 0 39 0,403 6 
Project 9 Organization 5 900.000,00 x 57 4 26 0,238 3 
Project 10 Organization 6 218.000,00 x x x x 0,014 5 
Project 11 Organization 7 1.100.000,00 x 24 x x 0,545 3 
Project 12 Organization 8 410.000,00 x x 0 24 0,288 5 
Project 13 Organization 9 195.000,00 45.000 18 x x 0 7 
Project 14 Organization 10 1.672.737,00 x x x x x 3 
Project 15 Organization 10 2.215.166,00 15.166 x 0 25 0,75 7 
Project 16 Organization 10 225.000,00 x 36 0 12 1 3 
Project 17 Organization 11 706.297,00 84.000 33 0 9 0,773 9 
Project 18 Organization 12 120.000,00 x 24 4 10 0,25 8 
Project 19 Organization 13 844.000,00 84.400 42 0 6 0,156 x 
Project 20 Organization 4 1.134.636,00 90.350 x x 24 1 x 
  TOTAL 16.777.565,71 514.944      
  AVERAGE 838.878,29  45,87 3,47 26,75 0,57 7,39 
  ST. DEVIATION 552.333,10  20,93 3,21 15,56 0,33 4,16 
APPENDIX B       Table 2: Government subsidies Spain developed in Morocco during the period 2002 - 2006 
*   quantities in euros € 








Subsidies to NGOs Subsidy Amount* AT?* Real Length** Initia delay** Final delay**
Physical 
A.Spec. Activities 
Project 1 NGO 1 295.583,00 x 26 0 8 0,166 22 
Project 2 NGO 2 500.000,00 x 28 2 6 0,367 21 
Project 3 NGO 3 171.230,00 x 18 0 0 0,68 7 
Project 4 NGO 3 174.466,41 x 18 0 0 0,583 5 
Project 5 NGO 4 119.996,48 x 21 1 1 0,472 7 
Project 6 NGO 1 202.897,08 x 27 0 8 0,121 31 
Project 7 NGO 5 120.104,76 x 24 -2 0 0,389 19 
Project 8 NGO 3 239.429,53 x 18 -2 -3 0,71 11 
Project 9 NGO 6 261.019,73 x 34 8 2 0,175 14 
Project 10 NGO 4 129.205,90 x 19 0 1 0,101 6 
Project 11 NGO 7 258.860,00 x 24 3 10 0,057 12 
Project 12 NGO 8 65.685,00 x 14 0 2 0,589 8 
Project 13 NGO 9 165.058,00 x 20 0 0 0,118 8 
Project 14 NGO 10 400.000,00 x 27 0 3 0 30 
Project 15 NGO 6 517.573,00 x 30 0 6 0,377 12 
Project 16 NGO 11 375.504,77 x 24 0 0 0,022 21 
Project 17 NGO 12 427.597,20 x 24 3 x 0,492 10 
Project 18 NGO 13 200.000,00 x 15 0 3 0,144 12 
Project 19 NGO 3 220.000,00 x 15 0 0 0,657 16 
Project 20 NGO 1 357.206,00 x 30 0 3 0,312 22 
Project 21 NGO 14 150.000,00 x 16 0 4 0,231 13 
Project 22 NGO 15 307.320,00 x 24 6 x 0,163 12 
Project 23 NGO 7 177.957,00 x 22 0 4 0,053 21 
Project 24 NGO 16 194.670,00 x 33 0 9 0,318 21 
Project 25 NGO 17 656.550,00 x 36 0 12 0,306 11 
  TOTAL 6.687.913,86       
  AVERAGE 267.516,55  23,48 0,76 3,43 0,30 14,88 
  ST. DEVIATION 141.985,95  6,05 2,16 3,80 0,22 7,06 
 
APPENDIX C     Table 3: International Aid Delivery Projects Spain developed in Morocco through subsidies to NGOs 
                                  during the period 2002 - 2006 
 Own source
*   quantities in euros € 







Subsidy Amount* AT?* Real Length** Initia delay** Final delay**
Physical 
A.Spec. Activities 
Project 1 Organization 1 279.390,95 x 12 3 0 0 34 
Project 2 Organization 2 173.362,00 x 18 0 0 0,193 3 
Project 3 Organization 3 156.000,00 x x x x 0,2 3 
Project 4 Organization 4 48.080,00 x 18 0 0 0,278 3 
Project 5 Organization 3 210.000,00 x x x x 0 4 
Project 6 Organization 4 40.413,00 x 12 2 6 0,334 4 
Project 7 Organization 5 200.000,00 x x x x 0 4 
Project 8 Organization 5 195.000,00 x x x x 0 4 
Project 9 Organization 6 270.000,00 x x x x 0,748 12 
Project 10 Organization 6 600.000,00 x x x x 0,2 12 
Project 11 Organization 6 210.000,00 x x x x 0,2 12 
Project 12 Organization 6 180.000,00 x x x x 0,2 12 
Project 13 Organization 6 180.000,00 x x x x 0,1 12 
Project 14 Organization 6 189.000,00 x x x x 0,1 12 
Project 15 Organization 6 200.000,00 x x x x 0,7 12 
Project 16 Organization 6 190.000,00 x x x x 0,079 12 
Project 17 Organizataion 7 200.000,00 x x x x 0 4 
Project 18 Organizataion 7 195.000,00 x x x x 0 4 
Project 19 Organization 8 318.762,00 x 18 0 0 0,415 0 
Project 20 Organization 8 184.372,00 x 13 0 0 0,577 0 
Project 21 Organization 8 220.158,00 x 9 0 0 0,781 0 
Project 22 Organization 8 356.000,00 x 18 0 0 0,45 0 
Project 23 Organization 9 310.373,00 x 18 0 0 0,309 0 
Project 24 Organization 9 272.000,00 x x x x 0,3 0 
Project 25 Organization 9 265.500,00 x x x x 0,311 0 
Project 26 Organization 9 50.000,00 x x x x 0,31 12 
Project 27 Organization 10 279.616,00 x 18 0 0 0,733 7 
Project 28 Organization 10 154.000,00 x 18 0 0 0,734 0 
Project 29 Organization 11 262.840,00 x 18 0 0 0,645 0 
Project 30 Organization 11 354.597,00 x 18 1 0 0 0 
Project 31 Organization 11 568.000,00 x 16 0 -2 0,6 0 
  TOTAL 7.312.463,95       
  AVERAGE 235.885,93  16,00 0,43 0,29 0,31 5,87 
  ST. DEVIATION 118.963,35  3,00 0,90 1,67 0,26 7,08 
APPENDIX D       Table 4: Government subsidies Spain developed in Ecuador during the period 2002 - 2006 
 Own source *   quantities in euros € 









Subsidies to NGOs Subsidy Amount* AT?* Real Length** Initia delay** Final delay**
Physical 
A.Spec. Activities 
Project 1 NGO 1 500.000,00 x 30 0 5 0,201 14 
Project 2 NGO 1 300.000,00 x 24 0 0 0,062 5 
Project 3 NGO 2 90.930,30 x 15 0 3 0,006 45 
Project 4 NGO 3 601.000,00 x 33 0 9 0,174 20 
Project 5 Ngo 4 316.334,96 x 28 0 10 0 32 
Project 6 NGO 5 268.552,73 x 12 0 0 0,291 23 
Project 7 NGO 10 250.000,00 x 14 0 2 0,01 22 
Project 8 NGO 5 240.000,00 x 12 0 0 0,111 24 
Project 9 NGO 4 266.810,00 x 23 0 3 0,078 14 
Project 10 NGO 6 157.940,92 x 12 0 0 0,027 23 
Project 11 NGO 7 606.509,00 x 13 0 1 0,033 45 
Project 12 NGO 8 605.000,00 x 26 0 2 0,598 9 
Project 13 NGO 1 391.962,62 x 34 12 x 0,032 22 
Project 14 NGO 2 149.515,63 x 12 0 0 0 13 
Project 15 NGO 9 125.000,00 x 21 0 9 0,598 15 
Project 16 NGO 3 300.000,00 x 20 x x 0,013 17 
Project 17 NGO 8 235.000,00 x x x x x 0 
Project 18 NGO 1 100.000,00 x 22 0 -2 0 10 
Project 19 NGO 9 684.761,37 x 35 0 5 0 22 
  TOTAL 6.189.317,53       
  AVERAGE 325.753,55  21,44 0,71 2,94 0,12 19,74 




           
 Own source  
 
APPENDIX E     Table 5: International Aid Delivery Projects Spain developed in Ecuador through subsidies to NGOs 
                                  during the period 2002 - 2006 
*   quantities in euros € 
























Si está activada la ponderación, consulte la tabla de clasificación para

















Bloque 1: Método = Introducir 
 
 

















-2 log de la
verosimilitud
R cuadrado




La estimación ha finalizado en el número de iteración
20 porque se han alcanzado las iteraciones máximas.



























Variables en la ecuación
,098 ,442 ,049 1 ,825 1,103
-,078 ,042 3,441 1 ,064 ,925
-,253 ,159 2,529 1 ,112 ,776
,182 ,085 4,659 1 ,031 1,200
-4,770 2,280 4,376 1 ,036 ,008
-20,644 21663,080 ,000 1 ,999 ,000
3,318 1,436 5,340 1 ,021 27,607












B E.T. Wald gl Sig. Exp(B)




























APPENDIX G    Figure 1: Organization Chart of Foreign Aid Spending in Spain 
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